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ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
     This appeal raises a question of considerable interest in 
this period of alleged rising police brutality in major cities 
across the country: when does an aggrieved citizen adduce 
sufficient evidence to a jury from which it can infer that a 
municipality has adopted a custom of permitting its police 
officers to use excessive force in the performance of their 
duties.  Specifically, we must determine if the plaintiff, Robert 
G. Beck, presented sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50(a). 
     Beck, a rehabilitation counsellor for the Epilepsy 
Foundation of America, sued Police Officer Anthony Williams and 
his employer, the City of Pittsburgh, in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, under 42 
U.S.C.  1983, for deprivations of his constitutional rights.  
Beck alleged that Williams engaged in police brutality and used 
excessive force against him while making an arrest, and that the 
City of Pittsburgh's custom of tacitly authorizing its police 
officers to use excessive force resulted in Beck's personal 
injuries and damages.  Beck brought additional pendent state law 
tort claims against Officer Williams. 
     The district court bifurcated Beck's cases against Williams 
and the City of Pittsburgh.  Beck's case against Williams ended 
in a mistrial when the jury could not return a verdict.  Beck 
dropped his case against Williams, and proceeded only against the 
City.  After Beck presented his case, the City moved for judgment 
as a matter of law.  The court granted the motion, holding that 
Beck presented insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 
find that the City of Pittsburgh had established a policy or 
custom tacitly authorizing its police officers to use excessive 
force.  Beck timely appealed to this court.  We reverse the 
judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
                                I. 
     In the early morning hours of October 31, 1993, Beck and 
two college friends left a Halloween party on the South Side of 
Pittsburgh.  Beck had borrowed his parents' car for the evening, 
and parked it in a vacant lot near the party site.  It had begun 
to sleet, and as Beck began to drive the car toward the exit of 
the parking lot, it skidded in circles on the wet pavement.  
Although the parties have differing views on what occurred next, 
for the purposes of this appeal, we must view the evidence in a 
light most favorable to Beck, the nonmoving party.  See Macleary 
v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081, 1083 (3d Cir. 1987).  Thus, we take the 
facts from Beck's testimony and other evidence presented by him 
at trial.   
     Beck testified that Officer Williams, working alone, 
blocked the only exit from the lot with his police cruiser.  
Williams stopped Beck's car, and ordered him out of the vehicle.  
Beck claimed that he complied with all of Officer Williams's 
commands.  Williams kicked the door shut as Beck attempted to get 
out of his car, then jerked open the door, and pushed his gun 
into Beck's face.  After cursing at Beck and using obscene 
language, Williams allegedly struck him in the face six to eight 
times with the end of his gun, pulled Beck from the car, forced 
him to the ground, and kicked him in the ribs.  At this time, 
several other police officers arrived at the scene.  An officer 
placed Beck into Williams's police vehicle, and Williams, alone, 
removed Beck to the police station.  There, he charged Beck with 
"driving under the influence" and reckless driving, and lodged 
him in a cell. 
     Subsequently, Beck filed a formal civilian complaint with 
the Police Department against Williams.  The Office of 
Professional Standards ("OPS"), the city department responsible 
for investigating complaints against police officers, 
investigated.  OPS took statements from Beck, his two companions 
who witnessed the incident, and Officer Williams.  Although 
Beck's friends fully supported Beck's allegations, OPS found 
Beck's complaint to be unfounded, noting that the mug shot taken 
on the night he was in custody did not reveal any evidence of the 
trauma he claimed.       
     At trial, Beck called Carla Gedman, a civilian assistant 
chief of OPS, as a witness.  Gedman supervises all OPS employees 
and investigators, and is responsible for forwarding all OPS 
findings through the chain of command in the Pittsburgh Police 
Department to the Chief of Police.  Gedman testified that OPS 
acts as a fact-finding body, and is not responsible for 
disciplining police officers.  OPS merely investigates each 
complaint against an officer for use of excessive force, and 
decides whether the complaint is "unfounded," "exonerated," "not 
sustained," "sustained," or "closed by memo."  It makes no 
recommendations.  OPS merely forwards its result to Police 
Department officials (see supra note 4).  The Department may 
overturn any OPS finding.  Gedman could not remember, however, if 
the Department ever actually had reversed an OPS finding. 
     Gedman testified that OPS will classify a complaint as 
"unfounded" when the facts indicate that the complainant is 
untruthful or inaccurate; and as "exonerated" when everything the 
complainant states is true, but OPS finds that the officer 
followed proper police procedure.  OPS will label a complaint as 
"closed by memo" when a complainant drops the claim, or is 
uncooperative in the investigatory process.  Further, OPS applies 
a preponderance of evidence standard in determining whether to 
sustain a complaint.  Gedman explained that the complainant has 
the burden of showing that 51% of the evidence supports his or 
her version of the incident.  Beck contends that OPS's 
preponderance standard mandates a finding of "not sustained" 
whenever OPS is faced with only the complainant's word against 
the officer's word.  Gedman stated that she "wouldn't be 
comfortable" with that assessment.  She testified, however, that 
a finding of "not sustained" amounts to a "draw," where OPS can 
neither prove nor disprove the allegations. 
     According to Gedman, OPS approaches each complaint against 
a police officer as a separate, independent event.  Thus, OPS 
cabins each complaint and will not consider prior conduct of or 
prior complaints against the officer in determining the outcome 
of the pending complaint.  Gedman further testified that OPS has 
no formal policy or mechanism in place to track prior complaints.  
She noted that, in the exercise of her discretion, she may alert 
police officials if she notices that an officer has a number of 
complaints against him or her within a short period of time, 
e.g., two months.  From her perspective, Gedman testified that 
she did not consider prior complaints of the use of excessive 
force relevant in assessing the pending complaint under 
investigation.  She further stated:  "We do not report patterns 
of cases to the police bureau."  However, the OPS annual report 
does contain statistics of complaints relating to police use of 
excessive force and statistics pertaining to complaints of police 
verbal abuse.  In some cases where Gedman believes it to be 
relevant, Gedman testified that she may report a series of 
incidents to the chain of command for a particular officer, but 
that is within her discretion.  She does not have a formal system 
for determining when or what particular conduct calls for such a 
report.  
     Beck also offered in evidence excerpts of the deposition of 
Charles Moffit, Pittsburgh's assistant chief of operations.  
Moffit is the first person in the police chain of command to 
review OPS findings.  He stated that the Police Department will 
only take an officer's prior conduct into account in reviewing an 
OPS finding if OPS has sustained a complaint against the officer 
for that conduct.   
     In addition to the above, Beck introduced reports of 
specific civilian complaints against Williams for use of 
excessive force.  In October 1990, OPS investigated a written 
complaint filed against Officer Williams by Demetrius Yancey.  
Yancey complained that for no apparent reason, Williams grabbed 
him and pushed his face hard against the police vehicle.  The 
officer searched him and was verbally abusive.  The OPS report of 
the case found:  Yancey's brother, who was present at the 
incident, gave a statement to the investigator almost identical 
to the complainant's.  Both brothers were questioned separately 
and there were no inconsistencies.  "The Yancey brothers were 
very vehement on the denunciation of Officer Williams conduct and 
also they were believable."  The report, however, recommended 
that the case be closed as not sustained because "there is [sic] 
no in depth corroborations of the allegations."   
     On April 10, 1991, OPS received a civilian complaint 
against Officer Williams from Dr. Irwin T. Templeton.  OPS sent 
this complaint to Williams's commanding officer for 
investigation.  The Chief of Police ultimately exonerated Officer 
Williams.  
     In June 1991, Dwayne Jones, a citizen, filed a complaint 
with OPS charging that while he was jogging, Officer Williams 
"for no apparent reason grabbed him and threw him into the rear 
of the police car. . . ."  He was hand-cuffed and removed to a 
police station.  Williams ignored Jones's complaints that the 
cuffs were too tight and hurting, searched him, found nothing, 
issued a citation and released him to a relative.  The complaint 
was not sustained because "there wasn't any evidence to prove or 
disprove the allegations."  The complaint also charged that 
Williams addressed him with obscene language and called him a 
"punk." 
     On July 8, 1991, Wayne Harvard filed a citizen's complaint 
with OPS charging Officer Williams with assaulting him and 
hitting him on the head and face with a billy club and with 
verbal abuse.  Hospital records described the source of Harvard's 
injuries as a fall or beating with a club.  Harvard admitted to 
falling in a foot chase but claimed that Williams struck him in 
the face causing some of the injuries.  He alleged that after he 
put his hands behind his back as ordered, Williams put handcuffs 
on him and "took a billy club, a small billy club, and hit me on 
the side of the face."  When Harvard inquired why the attack, 
Williams did not reply but "kept on hitting me and just beating 
me up" and called for back up.  
     On November 4, 1993, the plaintiff in this case filed his 
handwritten complaint with OPS.  In investigating this complaint, 
OPS also had written statements from each of Beck's friends who 
witnessed the alleged assault.  The complaint was disposed of as 
"unfounded."  In accordance with its practice, OPS made no 
reference to previous complaints against Officer Williams.  
     Slightly over two months later, on January 24, 1994, Donald 
Debold filed a complaint against Williams, who, with other 
officers, had come to his home to answer a domestic call.  The 
officers questioned Debold three times as to whether he had hit 
anyone.  When Debold answered in the negative, Williams began to 
taunt him.  Debold then said something to Officer Williams who 
responded by punching him in the jaw.  OPS exonerated Officer 
Williams.   
     None of the foregoing complaints was sustained and none of 
them resulted in discipline.  None of these dispositions was 
overruled by the Chief of Police or his assistant.  However, the 
Police Department did discipline Officer Williams once:  this 
action arose out of an internal police claim that he verbally 
abused a fellow police officer using language similar to that 
which Williams allegedly used in his past encounters with the 
civilian complainants.  As the district court observed and 
counsel for the City agreed:  "This shows that they treat a 
complaint by a fellow officer seriously." 
     Finally, Beck introduced OPS year-end reports, circulated 
through the Police Department, for the years 1991 and 1994.  The 
1994 report revealed that OPS sustained an overall 3.4% of "use 
of force" complaints in the years 1990 through 1994.  The 1991 
report noted, inter alia: 
         Use of force has been an issue in the past.  Actual 
         discipline for excessive force is very low. 
 
              Unlike many other police departments, ours does 
         not employ any formalized reporting mechanism for the 
         use of force . . . .  This type of report allows 
         objective evaluations of the use of force before 
         complaints are filed.  It would certainly identify 
         points for retraining, and officers typically engaged 
         in this behavior.  We could develop a better 
         understanding of the vague phrase "reasonable use of 
         force," as incidents routinely reported could be 
         audited and properly examined . . . .  Most cases 
         cannot be sustained because it is usually the officer 
         and complainant on the scene only; and no neutral 
         evidence is available.  We do report patterns of cases 
         to the Police Bureau however; e.g. an officer receiving 
         three complaints in two months. 
 
              The independent events do not indicate that the 
         civilians conspired against one particular officer.  
         The officer's credibility is at issue when a 
         discernable pattern of complaints develop [sic] . . . 
         officers and patterns like this will be focus [sic] of 
         our "early I.D." program . . . those that can't control 
         their temper or use verbal skills properly, run the 
         risk of aggravating the very situation which they are 
         called upon to assist. 
 
     After Beck rested his case, the City moved for judgment as 
a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(e).  The district court 
granted the motion, holding that Beck failed to present 
sufficient evidence to prove that the City had a policy or custom 
authorizing the use of excessive force by its police officers. 
                
                               II. 
     Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) provides, in 
pertinent part: 
         (1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully 
         heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient 
         evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for 
         that party on that issue, the court may determine the 
         issue against that party and may grant a motion for 
         judgment as a matter of law against that party with 
         respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the 
         controlling law be maintained or defeated without a 
         favorable finding on that issue. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).  This court's review of the district 
court's grant of judgment as a matter of law is plenary, and we 
must apply the same standard as the district court.  SeeLightening Lube, 
Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 
1993).  A motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal 
Rule 50(a) "should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no 
question of material fact for the jury and any verdict other than 
the one directed would be erroneous under the governing law."  
Macleary, 817 F.2d at 1083. 
     Beck claims that the City of Pittsburgh is liable for the 
injuries and damages he sustained at the hands of one of its 
police officers.  He alleges that the City, "through its relevant 
officials, tolerated and acquiesced in a custom of excessive use 
of force by its police officers by permitting a situation to 
exist where police officers were not disciplined or subject to 
review for the use of excessive force against citizens."  Beck 
brings this claim under 42 U.S.C.  1983, which provides, in 
relevant part: 
         Every person who, under color of any statute, 
         ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . 
         . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
         the United States . . . to the deprivation of any 
         rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
         Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
         injured in an action at law . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C.  1983.  
     Because Beck's claim is not based on ordinary negligence or 
tort principles but on a federal civil rights statute, the City 
is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the 
misconduct of its police.  Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 
F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990).  When a suit against a 
municipality is based on  1983, the municipality can only be 
liable when the alleged constitutional transgression implements 
or executes a policy, regulation or decision officially adopted 
by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.  Monell v. 
New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  
Thus, although the municipality may not be held liable for a 
constitutional tort under  1983 on the theory of vicarious 
liability, it can be held responsible as an entity when the 
injury inflicted is permitted under its adopted policy or custom.  
Id. at 694. 
     The Court's holding and reasoning in Monell have created a 
two-path track to municipal liability under  1983, depending on 
whether the allegation is based on municipal policy or custom.  
See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 & n.10 
(1986).  In Andrews, this court articulated the distinctions 
between these two sources of liability: 
         A government policy or custom can be established in two 
         ways.  Policy is made when a "decisionmaker 
         possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal 
         policy with respect to the action" issues an official 
         proclamation, policy, or edict.  A course of conduct is 
         considered to be a "custom" when, though not authorized 
         by law, "such practices of state officials [are] so 
         permanent and well-settled" as to virtually constitute 
         law. 
 
895 F.2d at 1480 (citations omitted); see also Bielevicz v. 
Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).  Custom, on 
which the plaintiff relies in this case, may also be established 
by evidence of knowledge and acquiescence.  See Fletcher v. 
O'Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 
U.S. 919 (1989). 
     In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), Officers 
of the Canton Police Department arrested Geraldine Harris.  While 
being processed at the police station, she fell down several 
times and became incoherent.  The officers did not summon any 
medical assistance for her.  Sometime after her release she sued 
for damages under 42 U.S.C.  1983.  The Court held that the 
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for  1983 
liability "only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate 
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come 
into contact."  Id. at 388 (footnote omitted). Although City of 
Canton involved a city's alleged failure to train its police 
officers, courts have adopted the "deliberate indifference" 
standard in other policy and custom contexts.  See e.g., Simmons 
v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1070 (3d Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992); see also Karen M. Blum, 
Monell, DeShaney, and Zinermon:  Official Policy, Affirmative 
Duty, Established State Procedure and Local Government Liability 
Under Section 1983, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 13 (1990).  This is 
consistent with the Court's narrow construction of municipal 
liability under 42 U.S.C.  1983 since Monell, limiting municipal 
liability to only those constitutional torts actually caused by 
the municipality.  See Michael T. Burke & Patricia A. Burton, 
Defining The Contours of Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C.  
1983: Monell through City of Canton v. Harris, 18 STETSON L. REV. 
511, 547 (1989). 
     In Simmons, 947 F.2d 1042, the plaintiff sued the City of 
Philadelphia under various theories of  1983 liability for 
failing to prevent her son from committing suicide while in 
police custody.  The plaintiff alleged that the City failed to 
properly train its employees in the prevention of suicide of 
intoxicated detainees, and that the City's policy or custom led 
to her son's death. 
     We held, in Simmons, that: 
         In order to establish the City's liability under her 
         theory that Simmons's rights were violated as a result 
         of a municipal policy or custom of deliberate 
         indifference to the serious medical needs of 
         intoxicated and potentially suicidal detainees, 
         plaintiff must have shown that the officials determined 
         by the district court to be the responsible 
         policymakers were aware of the number of suicides in 
         City lockups and of the alternatives for preventing 
         them, but either deliberately chose not to pursue these 
         alternatives or acquiesced in a long-standing policy or 
         custom of inaction in this regard. 
 
Id. at 1064 (emphasis added).   
 
     In Bielevicz, the plaintiffs alleged a violation of  1983 
against the City of Pittsburgh for a municipal custom of allowing 
its police officers to make illegal arrests for intoxication.  We 
held that to sustain a  1983 claim for municipal liability, the 
plaintiff must "simply establish a municipal custom coupled with 
causation--i.e., that policymakers were aware of similar unlawful 
conduct in the past, but failed to take precautions against 
future violations, and that this failure, at least in part, led 
to their injury."  915 F.2d at 851. 
     In the instant case, Beck argues that Officer Williams has 
exhibited a pattern of violent and inappropriate behavior, with 
five complaints of excessive use of force in less than five 
years.  These complaints include the Debold incident, which, 
although it occurred after Beck's experience, may have 
evidentiary value for a jury's consideration whether the City and 
policymakers had a pattern of tacitly approving the use of 
excessive force.  Beck asserts that if the City had proper 
investigative and police disciplining procedures in place, its 
police, including Williams, would not have pursued a settled 
practice of applying excessive force in arresting citizens, and 
Williams, in particular, would not have assaulted him.  
     The district court granted the City's motion for judgment 
as a matter of law, holding that Beck did not present sufficient 
evidence to show that the City had a policy or custom of 
authorizing the use of excessive force or abusive behavior.  The 
court addressed plaintiff's counsel, stating: 
         You would have the jury infer that because Williams was 
         never disciplined, the City tacitly authorized the use 
         of excessive force.  But I think the law is clear that 
         the jury can't make that assumption.  Judge Cohill has 
         an opinion in this court saying that isolated events 
         will not establish a pattern of abusive behavior.  
         Recitation of the number of complaints filed is not 
         sufficient to prove a policy or custom.  Policy or 
         custom have to be established by knowledge and 
         acquiescence.  I think [the] absen[ce of] any evidence 
         of a less than meaningful investigation or less than 
         meaningful response to complaints of excessive force is 
         fatal. 
 
                               III. 
     Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other 
wrongs or acts, although not admissible to prove the character of 
a person, are admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
knowledge.  What we have here are not mere isolated events or 
mere statistics of the number of complaints.  On the contrary, 
the plaintiff offered in evidence a series of actual written 
civilian complaints of similar nature, most of them before and 
some after the Beck incident, containing specific information 
pertaining to the use of excessive force and verbal abuse by 
Officer Williams.  All but one of the complaints had been 
investigated by OPS and had been transmitted through the police 
department chain of command to the Chief of Police.  Thus, he 
had knowledge of the complaints.  But, under the sterile and 
shallow OPS system of investigation, each complaint was insulated 
from other prior and similar complaints and treated in a vacuum.  
     The testimony of witnesses to some of these incidents was 
rendered weightless by OPS in its disposition of the complaints 
merely because the witnesses had accompanied the complainant at 
the time of the incident.  OPS appears to have assumed the 
credibility of Officer Williams's response, even though it 
recognized that "an officer's credibility is at issue when a 
discernable pattern of complaints develop. [sic]"  (See infra OPS 
1991 report)  OPS appears to have attached no credibility, 
however, to the complainant's witnesses if they accompanied the 
complainant at the time of the incident, even if an OPS 
investigator found them believable.  (See supra Yancey report)  
In the absence of testimony by witnesses having no connection 
with the alleged incident, OPS ultimately resolved almost all 
complaints against Williams or other officers on the narrow 
testimony of the complainant and the accused officer, thereby 
disposing of them unfavorably for the complaining citizen.  OPS 
did not consider prior citizen complaints of an officer's 
excessive use of force as relevant in assessing a pending 
complaint, and manifested no interest in probing the credibility 
of the officer under investigation.  Thus, it "did not report 
patterns of cases to the police bureau."   
     Without more, these written complaints were sufficient for 
a reasonable jury to infer that the Chief of Police of Pittsburgh 
and his department knew, or should have known, of Officer 
Williams's violent behavior in arresting citizens, even when the 
arrestee behaved peacefully, in orderly fashion, complied with 
all of the Officer's demands, and offered no resistance. 
     Because the complaints, especially those during the year 
1991, came in a narrow period of time and were of similar nature, 
a reasonable jury could have inferred that the Chief of Police 
knew, or should have known, of Williams's propensity for violence 
when making arrests.  See Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 205 
(8th Cir. 1992).  Three of the 1991 complaints were filed between 
April and July.  
     We reject the district court's suggestion that mere 
Department procedures to receive and investigate complaints 
shield the City from liability.  It is not enough that an 
investigative process be in place; as Beck's brief to us notes: 
         The investigative process must be real.  It must have 
         some teeth.  It must answer to the citizen by providing 
         at least a rudimentary chance of redress when injustice 
         is done.  The mere fact of investigation for the sake 
         of investigation does not fulfill a city's obligation 
         to its citizens. 
 
     None of the cases cited by the district court at trial 
support its conclusion that Beck's claim is barred simply because 
the City investigated his complaint, regardless of the adequacy 
of the investigation.  In Brandon v. Hart, the Supreme Court 
mentions that twenty complaints were filed against the officer 
whose behavior precipitated the suit in that case, 469 U.S. 464, 
466 n.3 (1985), but there is no discussion as to whether or not 
the Police Department had investigated those complaints.  In 
Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1987), cert.denied 484 
U.S. 986 (1987), not only were there numerous 
complaints filed against the accused officer which were 
investigated, but in addition the officer was suspended for two 
days as the result of one of the complaints.  Id. at 502.  There 
is no discussion of the City's procedures for handling complaints 
in Parker v. District of Columbia, 850 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).  We did note in Bieleviczthat the 
City-defendant in that case "followed an express policy 
of not investigating--or even accepting--complaints regarding 
alleged pretextual arrests" under a charge of public drunkenness, 
915 F.2d at 849, but we never suggested that this was a 
requirement for a successful  1983 claim.  See also Fletcher, 
867 F.2d 791; Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 
1981).  
     There are, on the other hand, very sound reasons to reject 
the rule that the district court implicitly suggests.  Formalism 
is often the last refuge of scoundrels; history teaches us that 
the most tyrannical regimes, from Pinochet's Chile to Stalin's 
Soviet Union, are theoretically those with the most developed 
legal procedures.  The point is obviously not to tar the Police 
Department's good name with disreputable associations, but only 
to illustrate that we cannot look to the mere existence of 
superficial grievance procedures as a guarantee that citizens' 
constitutional liberties are secure.  Protection of citizens' 
rights and liberties depends upon the substance of the OPS 
investigatory procedures.  Whether those procedures had substance 
was for the jury's consideration. 
     On reviewing the record, we find considerably more than 
Beck's complaints from which a reasonable jury could have found 
that the City's procedures are inadequate to protect civilians 
from police misuse of force.  The OPS itself was structured to 
curtail disciplinary action and stifle investigations into the 
credibility of the City's police officers.  Even if complainant's 
witnesses were credible, their testimony became inert under OPS 
policy, while at the same time police officers' statements 
appeared to have been given special, favorable consideration.  A 
jury readily could have found the Office of Professional 
Standards was nothing more than a facade to cover the violent 
behavioral patterns of police officers under investigation, to 
protect them from disciplinary action, and thereby perpetuate the 
City's custom of acquiescing in the excessive use of force by its 
police officers.   
     Because there is no formalized tracking of complaints for 
individual officers, a jury could find that officers are 
guaranteed repeated impunity, so long as they do not put 
themselves in a position to be observed by someone other than 
another police officer.  As we noted in Bielevicz, "it is logical 
to assume that continued official tolerance of repeated 
misconduct facilitates similar unlawful actions in the future."  
915 F.2d at 851. 
     Further, a jury would have had the benefit of OPS's 1991 
year-end report, which OPS had circulated to police department 
officials and which Beck introduced into evidence.  The 1991 OPS 
report brought to light several of the problems to which Beck 
refers.  It recognized that the department had a problem with 
police use of excessive force, and that the procedures in place 
may be inadequate to respond to the problem. ("Use of force has 
been an issue in the past.  Actual discipline for excessive force 
is very low.").  It acknowledged that many complaints were 
effectively dismissed because no independent witness was at the 
scene to observe the encounter.  ("Most cases cannot be sustained 
because it is usually the officer and complainant on the scene 
only; and no neutral evidence is available.").  And it conceded 
that repeated complaints against one officer may be cause for 
concern and some uncertainty as to that officer's veracity.  
("The officer's credibility is at issue when a discernable 
pattern of complaints develop [sic].").  The report also 
suggested that better procedures "would certainly identify points 
for retraining, and officers typically engaged in this behavior." 
     Gedman testified that the City took no action subsequent to 
the 1991 report.  The 1994 report showed that OPS had received 34 
complaints of police officer violence during the year 1991, none 
of which had resulted in disciplinary action.  OPS statistics for 
1992 and 1993 showed 39 and 38 civilian complaints of excessive 
police officer force respectively, and in 1994, an increase to 77 
complaints.   
     The City cites Bryant v. Whalen, 759 F. Supp. 410 (N.D.Ill. 
1991) for the proposition that statistical information alone is 
insufficient to support a  1983 claim.  In Bryant, the City of 
Chicago had a system similar to Pittsburgh's to investigate the 
use of excessive force by its police officers with an office, 
OPS, to do the investigation.  OPS would determine if the 
complaint was "unfounded," "exonerated," "not sustained," or 
"sustained."  It used a preponderance of the evidence standard of 
proof, which mandated a "not sustained" verdict if the evidence 
presented the OPS with only the complainant's word against the 
officer's word. 
     The plaintiffs alleged that several of Chicago's police 
officers assaulted them, and that these officers each had an 
extensive prior complaint history.  One of the officers had 39 
prior complaints of excessive use of force, none of which the OPS 
sustained.  The plaintiffs presented statistical evidence 
revealing that the OPS sustains 6.2% of complaints per year.  Id.at 421.  
They asserted that the low percentage of sustained 
complaints, and the repeated allegations against the defendant 
police officers, proved that the City showed deliberate 
indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens. 
     The district court in Bryant held that statistics alone of 
unsustained complaints of excessive use of force, without 
evidence that those complaints had merit, will not suffice to 
establish municipal liability under  1983.  Id. at 424.    See 
also Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768-69 (7th Cir. 
1985) (finding statistics insufficient to prove municipal 
liability because people may file complaints "for many reasons, 
or for no reason at all.") 
     Bryant, even if it were precedential and/or persuasive, is 
distinguishable from the instant case.  Beck presented 
considerably more than mere statistics.  He also presented 
evidence of actual written civilian complaints.  Further, he 
presented evidence that the City of Pittsburgh has no formal 
system in place for tracking complaints against its officers and 
that the citizen complaints were not isolated incidents.   
     Finally, in a colloquy with counsel, the trial court 
indicated that the absence of expert testimony to support 
plaintiff's case was a factor that influenced its decision to 
enter judgment as a matter of law.  To the extent that Gedman 
herself brought to light deficiencies in her own department's 
procedures, we see little need for the use of expert testimony to 
confirm her own insights.  As for drawing inferences from the 
evidence regarding the adequacy of the investigatory process, we 
again agree with Beck that "[t]o require expert testimony to 
prove this fact is ridiculous.  It is not beyond the ken of an 
average juror to assess what a reasonable municipal policymaker 
would have done with the information in this case." 
                                  
                               IV. 
     In sum, we draw no conclusion as to whether the evidence 
presented by Beck supports a determination that Pittsburgh 
policymakers knew about and acquiesced in a custom that tolerated 
the use of excessive force by officers of the Police Department.  
We do conclude, however, that Beck presented sufficient evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could have inferred that the City of 
Pittsburgh knew about and acquiesced in a custom tolerating the 
tacit use of excessive force by its police officers.  This 
evidence sufficiently precluded the entry of judgment as a matter 
of law by the district court. 
     Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
     Costs taxed against the City of Pittsburgh, appellee. 
 
      
